Firstly, he wasn't really involved in the original deal, so he presumably feels quite safe apologising for something he wasn't responsible for. After all, admitting to a cock-up of this magnitude might jeopardise his $11.75 million salary and bonus package.
Secondly, his claim that it was the "biggest mistake in corporate history" sounds suspiciously like corporate boasting. Perhaps this is to draw attention to how wonderful he is in clearing up the mess - after all he did receive a bonus of $10 million for the year in which he spun off AOL.
Thirdly, although the merger with AOL was probably the biggest mistake in terms of the absolute value of the deal, it self-evidently wasn't the biggest mistake in corporate history in any other way.
Fourthly, Bewkes seems to have taken entirely the wrong message from the merger - or worse, perhaps no message at all.
Let's go back to that third point. The merger was announced in 2000, with AOL valued at $164 billion. The merger ratio was in favour of AOL, with AOL shareholders receiving 55% of the new entity, AOL Time Warner. Soon after, with the drastic fall in Internet valuations, much of the value of AOL was written off. Eventually, in late 2009, AOL was spun off, with a market capitalisation of around $2 billion. Time Warner's stock price fell from around $250 at the time of the announcement (on an equivalent basis in the new stock that was issued in the deal.) to around $50 by the time of the spin off. On the face of it, that's a pretty bad deal for shareholders (although there were numerous other deals in the interim that complicate the picture). But AOL-Time Warner survived, and both Time Warner and AOL are now separate companies and reasonably successful.
Of course Time Warner shareholders have suffered. But they haven't lost everything, as shareholders in plenty of other companies have. Think of the UK banks such as RBS - its acquisition of ABN Amro for nearly $100 billion, mainly in cash, was not the sole cause of RBS' demise but weakened it so greatly that almost any problem would have pushed it over the edge. Think of all those smaller deals done by private equity companies at the height of the buy-out boom that have resulted in not only the investors losing everything but the banks that provided the finance taking huge hits too.
Moreover, whilst with hindsight the deal looks like a mistake, at the time it was widely praised:
"Together, they represent an unprecedented powerhouse,” said Scott Ehrens, a media analyst with Bear Stearns. "If their mantra is content, this alliance is unbeatable. Now they have this great platform they can cross-fertilize with content and redistribute.”
I love that second comment by the way - at least he got something right!
At the time you would have been hard pushed to find anybody who disagreed that this was a deal that created the media company of the future. To paraphrase Nassim Nicholas Taleb, of Black Swan fame (although I prefer Fooled by Randomess), we should not view as a mistake something that only looks foolish with hindsight. Bewkes is wrong therefore to claim that:
"The whole the idea of [the merger with AOL] was misguided in the first place… "
Rather than being a strategic mistake, what was wrong with the deal was rather prosaic:
- AOL had inflated its revenues - making a mockery of due diligence (a story for another day)
- It became apparent very soon after the deal announced that Internet companies across the board had massively inflated valuations
- Dial-up Internet connections, AOL's main business, were soon overtaken by broadband
- The global economic downturn 2001 hit Internet advertising very hard, at the same time as hitting Time Warner's advertising revenue hard
- Too little attention was paid to merger integration
I suspect that Time Warner would have faced massive derision if it had announced it was creating YouTube or Facebook rather than buying AOL in 2000. And that's not Time Warner's fault. It is however a powerful example of how supposed experts and specialists have no clue whatsoever about what the future holds.
So the lesson from this is not, as Bewkes would have it, "you have to know what you are" as a business, a statement that means almost nothing. It is that predicting the future is very difficult, and betting vast amounts on what you think the future might be is very risky. By all means let the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists take those risks - they are paid to do so and if they fail (as most of them will) so what. But beware when good, solid business, that are perhaps a little boring to run, suddenly take it into their heads that they have seen the future and want to spend tens or hundreds of billions chasing that future.